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Studies of the effect that defense spending has had on economic growth 
in less-developed countries have produced rather mixed results. We 
contend that this is because these studies have failed to take into ac-
count the relative financial constraints faced by individual countries. 
In an extension of the seminal work by Emile Benoit on defense spend-
ing and its effect on economic growth, 1 we hypothesize that relatively 
poor countries tend to cut back high-growth development expenditures 
in favor of maintaining defense programs, while relatively rich countries 
are much less likely to abandon development expenditures given a 
constant level of defense preparedness. Thus, we should expect a nega-
tive relationship between defense and growth in the poorer countries, 
but a positive relationship in the richer countries. 
In this article, we examine the relevant literature, and develop a 
model of defense and economic growth that explicitly incorporates 
resource constraints. The results of the cluster analysis that was used to 
group the sample of countries into a richer and poorer group are 
presented. Finally, the results of the within-group regressions are pres-
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ented. The estimated equations confirm the hypothesized relationships 
between defense spending and economic growth. 
Review of the Literature 
As a first step in his examination of the effect defense spending has on 
economic growth, Benoit calculated simple correlation coefficients 
using a sample of 44 developing countries between 1950 and 1965. 
Although the correlation coefficient was positive and "strong enough ... 
for there to be a 1000-to-one chance against it being accidental," he 
admitted that the result might be technically "spurious. ''2 To correct for 
this possibility, Benoit estimated this multiple regression equation: 
CIVGDP = f (INV, AID, DEFN) [l] 
CIVGDP is the real growth in GDP minus real growth in defense 
expenditures3, INV is the gross capital formulation as a percentage of 
GDP, AID is the receipts of bilateral aid as a percentage of GDP, and 
DEFN is defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Furthermore, the 
signs of the coefficients are all hypothesized to be positive. 
An examination of the results "showed the defense burden to have 
been a significant determinant of growth in the 1960-65 period but not 
for the longer period of 1950-65. "4 Recognizing that the data for the 
longer period was probably more accurate, and despite a positive coeffi-
cient for the defense variable, Benoit concluded that 
the residual positive correlation between the defense burden and the 
growth rate and its t-value appeared to be too weak to justify regarding 
the defense burden as a significant determinant of the growth rate. The 
correlation between them appeared likely therefore to have been spurious-
an artifact reflecting the action of the investment and foreign aid varia-
bles. 5 
In addition, Benoit questioned the direction of causality between 
defense and growth. While hypothesizing that countries that have 
enjoyed a rapid growth might "indulge themselves in the luxury of 
elaborate defense programs," he concluded that growth rates were a 
very weak determinant of defense levels and that "the direct interaction 
... seems to run primarily from defense burdens to growth rather than 
vice versa. "6 
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Benoit's findings were confirmed by Kennedy. In his analysis, 
Kennedy examined a large number of developing countries and con-
cluded that "the growth rate for GDP of individual countries did not 
seem to have been affected by their defense allocations. "7 Subsequently, 
Kaldor8 found a "strong association" between industrialization and 
arms expenditures based on an interpretation of data provided by the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Her admittedly 
"crude examination" of the ACDA data led her to "pick out groups of 
countries representing extreme situations. ''9 The groups examined were 
made up of countries with high rates of growth in both GDP and 
military spending, countries with low growth and low spending rates, 
and countries that experienced the worst of both worlds. A year later, in 
a critical review of Kaldor's work, Amsden noted the following: 
Given this diversity, it is even more incomprehensible how Kaldor arrives 
at her conclusion of a "strong association" between industrialization and 
arms expenditures (the ACDA data she presents in Table 1 in fact contain 
figures on rates of growth of GNP per capita rather than on rates of 
industrial growth.) Certainly the most elementary statistical analysis of 
the data ... on military burden (1972) and rates of growth of GNP per 
capita . . . does not reveal any positive association between the two 
variables, strong or otherwise.'° 
The simple correlation coefficient for Kaldor's sample of 40 underdevel-
oped countries was -0.18. 
McKinley and Cohen's statistical study" on the economic perfor-
mance of military regimes in Third World countries published shortly 
after Kaldor's article found that "aggregate military regimes do not 
perform significantly differently than civilian regimes." Although mil-
itary regimes perform "slightly better" than their predecessor civilian 
regimes, this association according to the authors "is not sufficiently 
strong to support the image of the military as a major force for economic 
development ... [I]t is equally clear that the simple equation of the 
military regime as an obstacle to development is quite erroneous. "t2 In 
other words, it is necessary to penetrate beneath the political superstruc-
ture to understand economic development. 
In this vein, Dabelko and McCormick attempt to assess the impact of 
changes in military spending on expenditures for public education and 
public health. 13 Their analysis grouped countries on the basis of their 
general forms of government: personalist, centrist, and polyarchic. The 
major findings of this study were the followipg: (I) Significant oppor-
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tunity costs exist for education and health for every country in the 
sample; (2) the level of economic development has little or no impact on 
these opportunity costs; and (3) personalist regimes tend to have higher 
opportunity costs of defense than do centrist and polyarchic regimes. 
For recent years, Dabelko and McCormick found that centrist regimes 
have lowered their opportunity costs of defense for education and health 
while the opposite is true for polyarchic regimes. 14 However, these 
patterns were very weak in a statistical sense. Most regressions equa-
tions contained coefficients that were not significant at the 95% level of 
confidence, and R values that were in general under 0.20. 
Smith, using mid-1960s data for a sample of 15 more developed 
nations, found that the growth-defense burden coefficient was -0.54. 
Smith attributed this to the fact that defense spending and investment 
represented mutually conflicting claims on resources. ts 
It is our hypothesis that these rather mixed results occurred because 
the relative financial resource constraints faced by individual countries 
have been left out of the analyses. In the next section, we present a model 
that explicitly incorporates this missing factor. 
A Model of Defense and Economic Growth 
in Developing Countries 
It is possible to argue that under certain circumstances defense spend-
ing can aid growth, while under a different set of conditions defense 
spending can hinder growth. Furthermore, both propositions are likely 
to be true at different points in time. 
On the positive side, defense expenditures may contribute to growth 
of the civilian economy as follows: 
(I) feeding, clothing, and housing a number of people who would other-
wise have to be fed, housed and clothed by the civilian economy ... (2) 
providing education and medical care as well as vocational and technical 
training ... (3) engaging in a variety of public works-roads, dams, river 
improvements, airports, communication networks, etc.-that may in part 
serve civilian uses; and (4) engaging in scientific and technical specialties 
... which would otherwise have to be performed by civilian personnel. 16 
On the negative side, there are at least three types of possible effects. 17 
The first effect, named the "income shift" by Benoit, is that increased 
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defense spending reduces the civilian GDP, and will thus tend to 
decrease growth proportionately. Second, it is argued that defense 
spending adversely affects growth because the government sector in 
general exhibits "negligible rates of measurable productivity increases. "18 
Finally, growth can suffer because increased levels of defense expendi-
tures take over resources that could otherwise have been employed as 
civilian investment and hence contributed to growth. 
While these arguments make intuitive sense, a crucial determinant (as 
mentioned above) in the relationship is the country's financial resource 
constraint. A country whose resources are severely constrained will 
almost always face budget reductions. We suggest that these reductions 
will often take the form of sacrifices in development projects so that 
defense programs can be maintained. Not only will this reduction tend 
to reduce economic growth per se, but as Hirschman'st9 unbalanced 
growth strategy would indicate (which we tested in the case of Mex-
ico20), a concomitant decrease in private investment is likely to occur as 
potential privately financed projects are cancelled. The shifting of the 
government's priority away from high-growth development projects 
and to defense in the face of budget cuts is likely for two reasons. First, 
governments usually find it more politically expedient to curtail capital 
investments (on infrastructure for example) instead of expenditures on 
the current account. Second, given that a defense establishment exists, 
special interest groups might find it economically advantageous to 
maintain the status quo. These groups might include high ranking 
officers, military contractors, and certain politicians. As budgets are 
reduced, military budgets are frozen and the brunt of the deflationary 
policy is born by the highly productive development projects. Thus for a 
resource constrained country we would expect a negative relationship 
between growth and defense spending. 
The reverse is true for countries that have a relative abundance of 
financial resources. These countries can more easily afford the growth-
oriented capital expenditure programs concomitant with maintaining, 
or even increasing, defense programs. 
If this thesis is correct, it is understandable why previous studies have 
failed to find a consistent relationship between economic growth and 
defense spending. Using a model based on resource constraints, it is easy 
to see why two developing countries with identical levels of defense 
spending can experience markedly different levels of growth. The rela-
tively rich country can afford high growth programs while the poorer 
country must limit funding levels for the same programs. 
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Empirical Results 
A number of conceivable proxy indicators for the availability of 
financial resources could be used to test our hypothesis. The selection of 
variables was based largely on the availability and comparability of data 
between countries. The main source of data was the World Bank. 21 Nine 
variables were selected to measure savings, investment productivity, 
foreign exchange availability, and import availability (Table 1).22 A 
priori each variable should have an effect on the defense burden-growth 
relationship as shown in Table l. 
As an initial step, a cluster analysis23 was performed using these nine 
variables for 37 out of Benoit's original 44 countries in sample.24 Four 
groups were identified (Table 2). Group I-the resource abundant 
group-was characterized by high growth in foreign exchange earnings, 
high import elasticity, a low debt-service ratio, a low incremental 
capital-output ratio, a high current account deficit/ GDP ratio, and a 
high government expenditure multiplier. 
Group II-the resource constrained group-was quite the opposite 
in nearly every case. This set of countries was characterized by low 
growth in foreign exchange earnings, a high incremental capital output 
ratio, a low percentage of exports to GDP, a high debt service ratio, a 
low current account deficit as a percentage of GDP, a low gov~rnment 
expenditure multipler, and low import elasticity. Three countries (Iraq, 
Burma, and Syria) make up Group III. This group falls between the two 
previous groups since the mean values are either higher, lower, or in 
between the values for Groups I and II. The cluster procedure isolated 
Vietnam into Group IV since this country had a number of extreme 
values for the nine variables. Inasmuch as the number of observations in 
Group III and IV is extremely small, we have considered these to be 
special cases. The analysis presented below concentrates on Groups I 
and II, the two largest groups. 
To determine the probability of having correctly grouped the coun-
tries into Groups I and II, a discriminant analysis was performed. The 
placement from the cluster analysis was used as the basis for the initial 
classification. Every country was correctly classified at the l 00% proba-
bility level, except for the Dominican Republic which had a probability 
of 88% of correct placement. 
As a next step-using Benoit's methodology, his data and his time 
frame (l 950-1965)-within-group linear regression equations were 
estimated in the form specified in equation l above. The estimated 
equations by group are as follows:2s 
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Group I 
CIVGDP = 1.77 + 0.16 INVEST+ 0.12 AID 
+ 0.22 DEFN; R2 = 0.89 
(6.11)** (3.07)** (3.77)** 
Group II 
CIVGDP = 4.72 + 0.15 INVEST+ 0.19 AID 
- 1.22 DEFN; R2 = 0.76 
(1.92) (1.46) (-3.52)** 
[2] 
[3] 
The most striking result is that for Group I-the resource abundant 
group-the coefficient of DEFN is positive and statistically significant 
at the 99% level of confidence. At the same time, the coefficient of 
DEFN for Group II-the resource constrained group-is negative and 
statically significant at the 99% level. Both results lend support to cur 
hypothesis that financial constraints play an important role in the 
defense-growth relationship.26 Furthermore, there is a sharp difference 
between our results and those obtained by Benoit. The regression equa-
tion for his sample of 44 countries was as follows:21 
CIVGDP = 1.14 + 0.21 INVEST+ 0.13 AID 
+ DEFN: R2 = 0.61. 
(5.57)** (2.30)** (1.34) 
[4] 
The coefficient for DEFN in equation 4 is not statistically significant, 
and the R2 value is lower than those obtained in either equations 2or 3.28 
These results suggest that in relatively nonresource constrained coun-
tries that either defense expenditures contribute to growth directly 
(because of the type of defense spending) or that these countries can 
maintain development programs (that contribute to growth) while 
maintaining or even increasing defense programs. On the other hand, in 
resource constrained countries the results imply that defense expendi-
tures hurt growth. In this case, it is not necessarily the type of defense 
spending that hurts growth, but rather that defense spending is main-
tained while highly productive programs are cut back. 
Thus it is quite easy to see why previous authors, who grouped on the 
basis of military regimes, have failed to find any pattern between defense 
· spending and growth. Some authors (notably Dableko and McCor-
TABLE 1 
Description of Variables Used in Cluster Analysis and 
Their Impact on the Growth-Defense Relationship 
Variable Description 
Private Saving (SA V)-as a % of 
Gross Domestic Investment, 
Average 1960-1973 
Effect of High Value on 
Defense Growth Relationship 
(-) A proxy indicator of the government's 
inability to finance expenditures 
through tax revenues 
Export Growth (EXPGRO)-Average 
annual growth rate (real), 1960-1973 
(+) Availability of foreign exchange 
Exports (EXPGDP)-as a % of current 
GDP, Average 1960-1973 
Private Consumption (PCONS)-
as a% of current GDP, Average 
1960-1973 
Incremental Investment to Incre-
mental GDP Ratio (ICOR)-
Average 1968-1973 
Civilian Consumption (CIVCON)-
as a % of general government 
total revenue, 1965 
Import Elasticity (IMPGDP)-Rate 
of Growth of current imports to 
current GDP, 19·'.'."0-1973 
Deficit in Balance of Payments 
(DEFGDP)-Balance on current 
account as% of GDP, 1965 
Debit Service (DEBTSV)-External 
Public Debt Service Ration, 1965 
(+) Openness of the economy reflecting 
the availability to transform and 
to achieve economic efficiency in 
production 
(+or-) May reflect a scarcity in savings for 
development or a high multiplier 
effect on economic growth 
(-) Low productivity of investment 
reflecting bottlenecks or government 
inefficiency in allocation, or a domi-
nant foreign exchange constraint 
(-) Reflecting a high government 
expenditure multiplier 
(+) Availability of foreign resources 
for expenditure 
(+) Ability of the government to have 
attracted foreign capital in the past 
to supplement domestic resources 
(-) Constraint on obtaining foreign 
exchange 
SOURCE: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Tables: 
1976 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
1978). 
mick) have suggested that an appropriate classification is the level of 
development. As a test of this proposition, per capita income was added 
as a tenth variable to the cluster analysis. The procedure resulted in a 
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equations were estimated for the high income and low income groups 
and the results were as follows: 
High Income Group 
CIVGDP = 1.6 + 0.17 INVEST+ 0.31 AID+ 
0.10 DEFN; R2 = 0.82 
(3.1)** (2. 7)* (0. 7) 
Low Income Group 
CIVGDP = 1.4 + 0.17 INVEST + 0.09 AID + 
0.17 DEFN; R2 = 0.54 
(2.1)* (l.3) (l.7) 
[5] 
[6] 
As can be seen, the coefficient of D EFN-while positive-is not statisti-
cally significant in either equation, and the R2 values are lower than for 
the equations reported above. 
Summary, Conclusions, and Areas for Further Research 
The purpose of this study has been to extend Benoit's original paper 
on the relationship between economic growth and defense expenditures 
in developing countries. In his original study, Benoit found no statisti-
cally significant relationship (either positive or negative) between 
growth and defense for a sample of 44 countries. Subsequent attempts 
by other economists arrived at contradictory results. We hypothesize 
that the relationship between growth and defense will be positive and 
statistically significant for countries that are relatively resource uncon-
strained while the opposite will be true for resource constrained coun-
tries.Jo A cluster analysis to group countries on the basis of resource 
constraints was performed on Benoit's original sample using nine varia-
bles to measure savings, foreign exchange earnings and availability, tax 
revenues, imports, and availability of capital. 
Four distinct groups of countries were identified. Group I consisted 
of 24 countries and was characterized by a relative abundance of finan-
cial resources. On the other hand, Group II, which consisted of nine 
countries, was relatively resourced constrained. Group III (Burma, 
Syria, and Iraq) were intermediate to Groups I and II, and Group IV 
consisted solely of Vietnam. 
Using Benoit's methodology, his data, and timeframe, linear regres-
sion equations were estimated for Group I and II. Civilian economic 
growth was the dependent variable, and the investment rate, the receipt 
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of bilateral aid, and the average annual defense expenditure were the 
independent variables. The most striking result-one that supports our 
hypothesis-was that the coefficient of the defense variable was positive 
and statistically significant at the 99% level for Group I, and negative 
and statistically significant at the same level of confidence for Group II, 
the resource constrained group. This result is in marked contrast with 
that obtained by Benoit. As an additional step, per capita income was 
included as a tenth variable to the cluster analysis. Two different groups 
of countries were identified, and the estimated regression equations for 
these groups yielded coefficients that were not significant for the defense 
variable. 
Thus, the main finding of this article is that defense expenditures in 
countries that are relatively resource unconstrained compete less for 
scarce resources. As a result of their other positive aspects (education, 
linkages with industry, etc.), defense expenditures may play an impor-
tant and positive role in increasing growth. Countries suffering from a 
relative lack of foreign exchange and government revenues, on the other 
hand, experience the reverse. For these countries, defense expenditures 
apparently siphon funds away from more productive domestic invest-
ments with a subsequent detrimental effect on growth. 
Stated in these terms, our results have fairly obvious implications. It 
would, however, be premature to draw any firm conclusions from these 
results-primarily because of sample size-until further research is 
completed. One area for further research might be to enlarge the sample 
size and reexamine the question of defense and economic growth for this 
or a later period. Other fruitful areas might include a disaggregation of 
defense expenditures (where data permit) to compare the effects on 
growth of different types of defense spending; an examination of how 
much additional growth the unconstrained countries might have 
achieved had they faced lower (or no) defense expenditures, and a 
comparison of the relative contributions over time of other government 
expenditures (such as health and social services) on economic growth. 
We hope that a general theory of defense expenditures and economic 
growth will emerge from this work. 
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